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When voters ‘punish’ the incumbents, does it affect the ideological congruence between incumbent 
parties and their voters? This study is an examination of an underlying tension between democratic 
values of representation and accountability that elections are normatively expected to serve in a 
democracy. I examine this tension through the concept of ‘punishing voters’. Punishing voters are 
conceptualized as the subset of the electorate who have previously voted for the incumbents, and 
switch their votes later based on economic evaluations. Using the data for 35 countries between 
2011–2016 from the fourth round of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I examine the 
hypothesis that ideological congruence between incumbent parties and their voters increases with 
rise in economic voting. This study is socially important as it implies that voters are forced to 
choose between retrospective evaluations and ideological congruence. The consequences of this 
argument are important for understanding the crises of democracies in the context of competing 
normative values that elections serve. 
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‘As the old jokes goes, economists have predicted six of the last three recessions. Well, political 
scientists have predicted nine of the last three crises of democracy.’ - Runicman (2011) 
Do democracies have an inbuilt tension in their electoral institutions that get manifested 
periodically through ‘crisis’? This thesis is an examination of the underlying tension between the 
dual democratic values of representation and accountability that elections are normatively 
expected to serve in a democracy. While the debate between accountability and representation is 
largely researched through the prism of the electoral systems, this thesis examines if voters are 
forced to choose between either retrospective evaluations or ideological preferences—irrespective 
of the design of the electoral system. This thesis thus seeks to contribute to the discourse on the 
crisis of democracy. 
The scholarly debates on the crisis of democracy are not new to political science. Among the 
contemporary accounts, there are those who highlight the crisis of democracy (Merkel, 2018) and 
the danger of illiberal turn in democracies (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019; Plattner, 2020; Foa and 
Mounk, 2017; Diamond, 2015; Zakaria, 2007), while there are others who highlight the tendency 
of democracies to self-correct by relying on critical citizens (Kriesi, 2020; Norris 1999) or through 
a thermostatic model of demand-supply (Claassen, 2019).  One instance of this crisis-ification of 
democracy narrative can be gauged from the 2021 report of Freedom House titled self-evidently 
as Democracy under siege (Repucci and Slipowitz, 2021) which highlights the 15th consecutive 
year of decline in global freedoms. There are however multiple approaches to this crisis-ification 
narrative. 
Another way to look at the crisis of the democracy is through the lens of the health of democracy. 
To gauge this health, ‘satisfaction with democracy’ is often used as one of the questions in large 
N survey-based comparative studies. While there are many disagreements over the measurement 
and interpretation of ‘satisfaction with democracy’ (Linde and Ekman, 2003; Anderson, 2002; 
Canache et. al 2001) the political science is rich with scholarship (Kostelka and Blais, 2018; Van 
der Meer, 2017; Wagner et al., 2009, Zmerli and Newton, 2008; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008; 
Anderson and Guillory, 1997) that explores the possible determinants and consequences of this 
satisfaction. However, if democracy is intended to serve competing democratic values, then the 
satisfaction with democracies will always be a work-in-progress. 
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The standard approach for explaining the tension between multiple normative democratic values 
has been to outline the different theoretical approaches to qualify democracy. For example, 
Landwehr and Steiner (2017) argue that the satisfaction with democracy is dependent upon the 
normative conception of democracy that citizens value. There have also been attempts to highlight 
and bridge the divide between the distinct approaches of political theorists and empirical political 
scientists (Sabl, 2015). Other studies have sought to arrive at a consensus on the empirical 
dimensions of democracy that can be used for a useful comparative analysis (Fishman, 2016). In 
contrast to such reconcillatory studies, the claim that this thesis seeks to theoretically advance and 
empirically examine is if there is an ‘irresolvable’ tension between the two fundamental 
democratic values of representation and accountability—irrespective of the electoral systems and 
the qualified democratic theories. There are many contemporary real-world examples of this 
tension between democratic values. 
In the recently concluded USA Presidential elections, ex-president Donald Trump from 
Republican Party saw an increase in his popular vote share from 46.1% (2016 elections) to 46.9% 
(2020 elections). Based on this statistic alone, one would intuitively expect that the electorate has 
‘rewarded’ the performance of president. More importantly, the argument that the ‘general will’ 
of the US electorate has changed as compared to 2016 Elections would be a tall proposition to 
verify. If it has not, this would imply that the final electoral results are independent of the ‘general 
will’ of the electorate in this instance. By ‘general will’, I imply the overall ideological preferences 
of the majority of the electorate (notwithstanding the distinction between popular vote and 
electoral college). The argument here is to examine if elections can be simultaneously seen as a 
reflection on the performance of President, and also as a mechanism to understand the general will 
of the electorate. 
This could be dismissed as one of the rare cases (2016 US Presidential elections) where the 
presidential candidate with lower popular vote-share got majority of electoral votes. One could 
also choose to not generalize using a peculiar US electoral system along with its relatively unique 
two-party system that is entrenched in US political culture. However, one can also find similar 
examples from the old western democracies of UK, France, Germany or from the new democracies 
in central and eastern Europe. The composition of electoral system, party system, vote-to-seat 
formula varies across the Europe. However, the point of tension between democratic values 
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remains. When a conservative party voter in UK or a socialist party voter in France chose to punish 
their incumbent government in 2019 and 2017, did they have any alternate center-right or left party 
that would be ideologically closer to their preferences? In general terms, the question is when 
voters seek to punish the incumbent government, do they have any alternate political party that 
can represent their ideological preferences?  This question is relevant for the scholarship on 
electoral studies—especially with respect to economic voting.  
In the studies on economic voting, this tension between these values could be located in the 
‘instability’ problem. This ‘instability’ of the relation (between economic conditions and vote-
choice for incumbents) is often understood in the context of weakening clarity of responsibility or 
through increasing multi-level governance and economic inter-dependence (Duch and Stevenson, 
2008). It is however the clarity of available alternatives (Anderson, 2000; Bellucci, 1984 cited in 
Freire and Santana-Pereira, 2009) that aptly demonstrates the claim of this thesis. This approach 
argues that economic evaluations are more visible, when there are clear alternatives that are not 
ideologically very distant. Can this be interpreted as tension between voting for retrospective 
evaluations or voting for ideologically proximate parties? 
Taking this as starting point, this thesis examines the effect on ideological congruence between 
incumbent parties and their voters, when economic voters switch their votes from incumbents to 
non-incumbents. More specifically, the aim of the thesis is to scrutinize if voters are forced to 
choose between either punishing incumbents or voting for an ideologically congruent party. By 
ideological congruence, I imply the distance between ideological position of the parties and their 
voters.  The study uses the integrated database from the multiple rounds of Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) to examine this proposition. There are three novel contribution of the 
thesis to the scholarship on electoral studies. First, it meaningfully uses the concept of ‘switching 
voters’ in economic voting scholarship. Second, it delineates ‘punishing voters’ as those who have 
switched their votes from incumbent to non-incumbent parties on economic evaluations. Lastly, 
the concept of ideological congruence is examined at a disaggregated level of incumbent parties. 
Most importantly, this thesis clearly outlines the mechanism by which electoral accountability can 
affect ideological congruence. 
The thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter of thesis helps in understanding the tension 
between the normative functions of elections in different democratic theories from an empirical 
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perspective. The second chapter outlines a theoretical framework for a normative theory of 
democracy that is primarily concerned with accountability. The third chapter unpacks how 
economic voting can be seen in the framework of this normative theory of democracy. The fourth 
chapter highlights the research design, findings, and data analysis. This is followed by the final 






















1 COMPARATIVE DEMOCRACIES 
This chapter provides an overview of the empirical studies on understanding the role of elections 
in democracies. It first argues that in studies on comparative democracies, elections are an 
indispensable component in measurement and comparisons of democracies. The second section 
examines the theoretical frameworks that were developed for understanding the normative role of 
elections in a democracy. It particularly looks at the two broad normative functions of elections – 
accountability and representation and underlines the relation between them. It does this by 
evaluating the empirical studies on comparative democracies and comparative electoral systems. 
The third and final section try to examine this trade-off in the theories of voter behavior. It 
concludes by arguing that there is no theory of voter behavior that emphasizes the value of 
accountability. Further, when one compares the empirical studies on comparative democracies and 
comparative electoral systems, against studies on comparative voter behavior, there is no 
systematic investigation of trade-off between accountability and representation.  
1.1 Elections and Democracy 
This section outlines how democracies can be meaningfully compared on the basis of elections. 
To outline the starting point, ‘elections’ are an indispensable component for a polity to be qualified 
as democratic –– irrespective of how ‘democracy’ is conceptualized. However, there are 
arguments over whether government contestability would be a more meaningful indicator than 
elections (Trantidis, 2017). The Democratic Electoral Dataset (DES) compiled by Matt Golder 
(2005) provides an overview of the electoral systems used across 199 countries between 1946 and 
2000, hinting at its universal application across diverse polities. The dataset reveals that almost 
half of the elections in the observed period occurred under dictatorship, raising questions on the 
utility of elections in maintaining dictatorial rule. A more comprehensive comparison of electoral 
practices is offered through the indices of democracies.   
Indices for comparing democracies such as Freedom House, Democracy Index, and V-Dem index 
often have multiple weighted components related to the practice of elections in the calculation of 
their index. Coppedge et al. (2011) discuss the weakness of these traditional measures of 
democracies by highlighting contestations over measuring democracy. These are related to 
definition, precision, coverage and sources, coding, aggregation, and validity-reliability’. They 
allude to the fundamental problem of no consensus on what democracy at large means beyond the 
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prosaic notion of rule by the people (2011, p. 253). They offer a way out by classifying six possible 
ways of conceptualizing democracies. These are electoral democracy, liberal democracy, 
majoritarian democracy, deliberative democracy, participatory democracy, and egalitarian 
democracy. Their key contribution for comparing democracies lies in defending the utility of a 
‘disaggregated’ measure of democracy. For example, a majoritarian democracy theory would place 
a higher emphasis on the role of elections as a tool for accountability of government. To summarize 
their argument, comparison of democracies is widely contingent on the normative democratic 
values under consideration. These normative democratic values shape the role of elections in 
democracy.  
So, what exactly are the possible roles that elections can serve in a democracy? One way to answer 
this question would be to examine the genealogy of elections and democracy. An examination of 
the political theories with respect to the intellectual history of ‘popular sovereignty’ or with respect 
to the intellectual history of ‘democratic’ rule might yield more comprehensive answers. However, 
this is not the focus of my study. My limited interest here is to probe the tension between two 
specific normative functions of elections over which there is a reasonable academic consensus — 
between representation and accountability. The next section looks at the dominant findings from 
empirical studies on comparative democracies and comparative electoral systems. 
1.2 Representation Accountability trade-off 
This section brings out the contrasts between few of the landmark studies on the classification of 
democracies. Arend Lijphart (1984, 2012) and Powell’s (2000) scholarship act as an anchor point 
for this classification. Both deploy a similar principle to classify democracies. This principle is 
about the way power is concentrated or dispersed across institutions. The democracies that 
concentrate power for decision-making are classified as majoritarian democracies, while those that 
disperse power are classified as consensual (Lijphart) or proportional democracies (Powell). This 
classification is then used to examine how these democracies perform on a range of conceptual 
categories (congruence, accountability, kindness, gentleness, etc.). While the major differences in 
their work have been already noted (Achen et al., 2011); from this thesis’s perspective, Powell’s 
studies depart from Lijphart’s work in another two ways. Powell advances the distinction between 
democracies by highlighting the centrality of the electoral system in the classification of 
democracies, as opposed to Lijphart’s work where elections are one of the many institutions. 
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Second, Powell makes a stronger and clearer case for associating majoritarian democracies with 
accountability. Both converge on their findings that majoritarian democracies are likely to perform 
better at accountability, while proportional democracies are likely to perform better at congruence. 
They however differ on their interpretations of the possible ‘trade-off’. Lijphart concludes that 
there is no trade-off between governing effectiveness and high-quality democracy (2012, p. 296).  
Powell (2000) however makes a clear case that there is a trade-off between accountability and 
representation. This idea of trade-off has subsequently been normalized to an extent that scholars 
have sought to identify sweet spot between the two values by tweaking some features of electoral 
systems (Carey and Hix, 2011). Katz (1997) who is otherwise critical of Lijphart’s narrow 
classification of democracies also states that there is an incompatibility in the normative 
democratic values and that one is compelled to make trade-offs in institutional design based upon 
given societal requirements. The idea of trade-off has been also explored from the perspective of 
how electoral rules might shape the voting behavior. 
Norris (2004) and Thomassen (2014) examine if there are institutional and cultural factors that can 
affect the voter behavior. They borrow from Powell and Lijphart’s classification of democracies 
and the normative function of elections in these democracies. However, they too arrive at different 
findings. Thomassen (2014) argues against the more conventional findings of Lijphart and Powell. 
He finds no evidence for the proposition that retrospective voting is more common for majoritarian 
democracies or that policy voting is more common for consensus democracies. He argues that 
dimensions of party system such as clarity of responsibility and polarization are more important 
in shaping the voter behavior and their attitudes towards the political system. Norris, on the other 
hand, implicitly hints at the trade-off emerging from the impact of electoral rules on voter behavior. 
For example, she argues that majoritarian elections are significantly associated with weak 
cleavage politics (2004, p. 255). There are however another two academic positions that doubts 
the ability of elections to do both the things simultaneously or even separately. 
Achen and Bartels (2016) underlined the inability of elections to serve function of either 
accountability or representation. They argue that the voting behavior in US is more likely to be 
explained by the social identities of the electorate. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999) raise 
similar questions about voter behavior by providing a theoretical framework to examine if voters 
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can perform both these functions simultaneously. They conclude that elections are just not a 
sufficient instrument of control over politicians. They stress on the need for institutional creativity. 
My study intends to bring out this need for institutional creativity. It does so by highlighting the 
mechanism that demonstrates the inability of elections to do both the tasks simultaneously. The 
use of elections for performing one democratic value (punishing) simultaneously undermines its 
ability to serve the other value (ideological congruence) as single vote cannot do both jobs 
simultaneously (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, 1999). In the next section, I outline the normative 
democratic values that the dominant theories of voter behavior work with. I intend to trace if the 
theories of voter behavior can be distinguished on the lines of representation and accountability.  
1.3 Trade-off in voting behavior studies 
This section examines few of the dominant theoretical approaches in explaining voter behavior. 
These different approaches reveal how the scholarship on voter behavior is still fragmented when 
it comes to competing democratic values of representation and accountability. Perhaps only 
Thomassen (2014) provides a systematic analysis on examining whether economic voting and 
policy voting are relatively stronger phenomenon in majoritarian and proportional democracies, 
respectively. As opposed to relatively rigid boundaries of a trade-off in democratic values between 
majoritarian and proportional democracies, there is no similar discussion of trade-off between the 
theories of voter behavior. One could argue that theories of voter behavior are not meant to answer 
such conceptual questions about democracy, and that they are primarily meant for explaining voter 
behavior with respect to party-vote or party-identification, or the ideological positions adopted by 
voters and parties, and the relations between them. However, in doing so, they inadvertently favor 
one conception of democracy over other. A closer look at these theories would substantiate this 
claim. 
Some of the most prominent theoretical approaches for studying voter behavior are a) socio-
structural theories b) cultural modernization theories c) spatial theories of direction or proximity 
d) rational choice theories. The explanations for party-vote using socio-structural theories or socio-
psychological models typically indicate that vote-choice is largely an ‘inward’ function of voters, 
dependent upon voters’ position in a society. The ‘performance’ of the incumbents or the 
orientation of the voters towards representatives is at best treated as a short-term factor shaping 
the political preferences. This is generally accounted for by including such orientations in the 
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statistical models as one of the ‘control’ variables. On the other hand, spatial theories of democracy 
work with a very particular understanding of democracy. They are interested in unpacking the 
‘general will’ of people or to map out the political space in a polity. In other words, they unpack 
the way entities (parties and voters) interact with each other on the ideological spectrum. This 
spectrum too is generally oblivious to performance of the incumbent government. 
As stated earlier, these theories are not intended to answer the questions about the ways in which 
the voters can hold the government accountable. That is however precisely the point that I seek to 
underline. Apart from economic voting, the other approaches of voter-behavior (implicitly) rule 
out or underplay democratic value of ‘accountability’. The historical origins and the subsequent 
trajectory of these theoretical approaches provides further evidence for the aforementioned 
argument.  
1.3.1 Socio-structural and Cultural modernization theories: 
This section examines the conception of democracy that socio-structural and cultural 
modernization theories of voter behavior work with. The historical origins of socio-structural 
theories provide the first instance of how vote-choice was seen as an expression of political 
behavior of citizens. Evans (2004) outlining the importance of Michigan model with its socio-
psychological explanations, characterized it as the first formalized model of voting behavior. The 
introduction of surveys by commercial polling companies arguably provided a major impetus in 
election studies, especially with what are also known as Columbia voting studies (Lazarsfeld, 
Berslson, and Gaudet, 1968; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954). Achen and Bartel (2014) 
characterize their contribution as pioneering, and pathbreaking. They however reiterate the 
failings of the ‘populist ideal of democracy’ highlighted by these studies. The focus of these 
scholarship with respect to voter behavior has been ‘in-ward looking’ either at an individual or at 
a macro-level. 
Subsequent sociology-driven developments in socio-structural theories and cultural modernization 
theories examined the consequences of the interaction between different social groups. These 
theories tried to account for the effects of macro-variables (age, class, region, gender, etc.) on the 
party identification. While the early studies were focused on understanding how partisan 
attachments are developed through socialization, the scholarship subsequently progressed to 
examine how the changes in social structures might help in understanding their political choices 
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and the emergent party systems from those choices. Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work was useful 
in understanding the social cleavages that emerge in processes of societal transformation especially 
at their critical junctures. Such socio-structural explanations eventually elicited studies that 
emphasized agency-centered explanations, either by political elites or by citizens themselves. For 
example, Sartori (1969) outlined a political sociology approach (as opposed to sociology of politics 
approach) which underlined the agency of political elites to convert social cleavages into political 
cleavages.   
Other scholars such as Dalton (2002), Inglehart (1977), Inglehart and Norris (2003) examined how 
political choices and political attitudes among citizens can be explained through the new value 
cleavages. The argument of these scholars of ‘cultural modernization’ theories is that there is a 
shift in the political culture as societies ‘modernize’ from agrarian to industrial to post-industrial 
modes of organization of the economy. The shift in political culture can be captured by changing 
value-orientations and attitudes of the citizens. Such explanations are often used to understand the 
changes in partisanship, voter turnout, and weakening of traditional social cleavages.  
One of the related strands of scholarship to emerge from this arch of cultural modernization 
theories was to measure the trends in the stability of social and political cleavages. This had 
implications for development of concepts like electoral volatility, party system stability, party 
system polarization etc. Further, the scholarship has also examined the trends of ‘de-alignment’ 
and ‘re-alignment’ of social cleavages in electoral politics. Scholars have also sought to apply 
these concepts in new democracies under different institutional settings. For example, stabilization 
of party-systems (seen as key to survival of democracies in western democracies) is often 
examined in these new democracies in the context of consolidation of democracy. There is thus an 
inherently normative appeal of democracy that is implicitly attached with the scholarship that 
emerges from socio-structural and cultural modernization theories. 
Irrespective of whether the studies are macro or micro, agency driven, or structure driven, these 
theories seem to implicitly value a particular conceptualization about democracy. This 
conceptualization sees the vote (or voting intention) as the manifestation of the socio-political 
preferences of the citizens, where elections are ‘primarily’ a reflection of the socio-political space, 
and not an instrument of accountability. This overlooks the ability of voter to behave as an 
appraiser of past events, past performance, and past actions (Key 1966).  The rational choice 
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theories especially in the mold of spatial theories of voting provide another lens to examine how 
voter behavior theories have examined the democratic value of accountability. 
1.3.2: Spatial theories of voting 
Anthony Downs’ Spatial theory of voting (1957) grounds the voter behavior from the discipline 
of economics. Broadly an extension of the rational choice theories, studies anchored in this logic 
outline the utility of a decision for the given rational actor. The electoral market is seen as one of 
the spaces of interaction between these actors - voters and political parties. From this theoretical 
perspective, there is an attempt to understand the formations and transformations in the ideological 
positions of parties and voters. The political behavior of the actors is thus shaped by the demands 
and supplies on a particular ideological spectrum. The directional theories and proximity theories 
(Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989) that emerged as an offshoot from this perspective, are 
typically concerned in analyzing how the distance between parties and electorate can be mapped 
in the most accurate way to represent the political reality. However, these theories do not shed 
much light on how performance of the government can be mapped in political space.  
Let me summarize the argument here. The tension between accountability and representation 
which is well researched in studies of comparative democracies and comparative electoral systems, 
goes relatively missing in theories of voter behavior. Socio-structural theories and rational choice 
theories (particularly spatial theories) are two broader paradigms to study voter behavior. 
However, they are almost indifferent to the aspect of the incumbents being accountable to the 
electorate.  
Such questions are largely understood through the scholarship on economic voting. Economic 
voting can be seen as one application of the accountability theory of democracy. It is based on 
examining the performance of government on economic conditions through a matrix of reward 
and punishment. Economic voting thus can also be seen as a derivative of the rational choice 
theories – where the voters engage in a particular kind of rational behavior.  However, these 
theories do not have a corresponding normative theory of democracy. The next chapter looks at 





2 ACCOUNTABILITY THEORY OF DEMOCRACY  
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for grounding the central claim of thesis —
examining the effects of economic voting on ideological congruence. The chapter is structured as 
follows. The first section argues that there is a need for a normative theory of democracy that 
primarily values accountability, where the ability of electorate to ‘punish’ the incumbents based 
on retrospective evaluations is the central concern. The second section examines how 
accountability can be theorized for a normative theory of democracy. It makes a case for how 
electoral accountability (through economic voting) can be seen as one of the simple and direct 
applications of this theory of democracy. The third and final section discusses the problems with 
electoral accountability, providing a framework for examining the consequences of economic 
voting. 
2.1 Accountability in normative theories of democracy 
This section argues that accountability is relatively an under-theorized value in most of the 
normative theories of democracy. It then proposes to examine what an accountability theory of 
democracy would imply for the role of elections. Dahl (1956, p.1) famously argued that There is 
no democratic theory—there are only democratic theories. Providing an inventory for research on 
political participation, Teorell (2006) identifies responsive (or populist) theories, deliberative 
theories, and participatory theories as the three major conceptualizations of democracy to explore 
the determinants and consequences of political participation. However, accountability or 
evaluation of the incumbents is not a primary concern of any of these theories. Let me briefly 
underline the primary features of these normative theories of democracy. 
Populist theories or responsive theories are concerned with the normative value of responsiveness 
of the system to the preferences of the people (Dahl, 1956; Verba, 1996; Verba and Nie, 1972). 
Participatory theories (Aragones and Sanchez-Pages, 2009; Bherer, Dufour, and Montambeault, 
2016; Pateman, 2012; Schiller, 2007; Wolfe, 1985) unpack the ways through which citizens can 
be involved in the decision-making. Deliberative theories (Gutmann and Thompson, 2009; 
Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012; Cohen, 2007; Fishkin and Laslett, 2008; Bohman, 1988) on the 
other hand, are concerned in unpacking how the preferences of the citizens are formed. At their 
core, all these theories of democracy are concerned about the processes of decision-making in a 
polity. What distinguishes the accountability theory of democracy from these conventional 
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theories is the high premium it places on ensuring that decision-makers are hold accountable to 
those affected by these decisions. Let me now underline how accountability can be understood. 
This will be useful in examining the accountability mechanism that can be situated with respect to 
economic voting. 
2.2 Theorizing accountability for economic voting 
At the outset, it is important to note that there are various dimensions of accountability in a 
democratic political system. For example, Bovens (2007) in Table 2. 1 provides an overview of 
these dimensions. 
Table 2.1: Dimensions of accountability (Source: Bovens 2007, p. 461) 









Based on the nature of the conduct Financial accountability 
Procedural accountability 
Product accountability 
Based on the nature of obligation Vertical accountability 
Horizontal accountability 
Diagonal accountability 
The focus of my thesis is however limited to examine the effects of only one type of political 
accountability, which is shaped by elections. This political accountability through elections is 
probably the oldest dimension of accountability. One could argue that the roots of the 
accountability theory of democracy are associated with the failings of ‘populist’ theories of 
democracy. Walter Lipmann (1946) outlined the inability of the electorate to live up to the classical 
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populist doctrine of influencing policymaking. He highlights the inability of an average voter to 
know enough about political matters for political participation. This critique of populist democracy 
was further solidified by Joseph Schumpeter (1942). He conceptualized democracy by limiting it 
to an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals’ acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. (1942, p. 269). This 
limited view of democracy would fit well with the accountability theory, where voters are engaged 
in retrospective evaluations of the incumbents. Achen and Barels (2016) call this a theory of 
leadership model where election outcomes hinge not on ideas but on public approval or 
disapproval of the actual performance of incumbent political leaders (p. 4). This retrospective 
theory provided an alternative theory of democracy, without expecting political acumen from the 
voters about the political parties or ideologies or political system.  However, what would then such 
an accountability imply? 
In the broadest term, accountability is a ‘retrospective’ and ‘relational’ concept of providing 
answers. (Bovens, Goodin, Schillemans, 2014). Although there are other ways to characterize this 
relational concept (accountors and accountees, or actors and forums, or agents and forum), the 
conventional framework to study accountability in political science is through an economic lens 
of ‘agent-principal’, where agents (incumbent government or elected representatives) are entrusted 
power on behalf of principal (democrats or citizens or electorate) for decision-making. Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes (1999) offer an account of how elections can be utilized to serve a pure 
accountability approach. They outline what Mansbridge (2014) terms as a ‘sanctioning’ 
mechanism—where citizens control government so that those incumbents who act in the best 
interests of citizens win re-elections and those who do not lose them (pp 38). Mansbridge (2014) 
on the other hand offers a more positive, trust-based accountability outlining a selection model. 
This model is useful when agents are intrinsically self-motivated and aligned with the interest of 
the principal and especially when the monitoring of agents is not only difficult but also has adverse 
effects on the actions of agents. She argues that this selection model allows the agents ‘autonomy’ 
to respond flexibly to unforeseen situations. These two approaches offer two competing 
perspectives on conceptualizing elections as a tool of accountability. 
Electoral accountability thus can be seen as one specific manifestation of accountability theory of 
democracy. It can be conceptualized in conventional agent-principal framework as one of the 
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simplest and most direct forms of vertical democratic accountability between citizens and 
incumbents. However, there are multiple issues with this framework of electoral accountability.  
2.3 Problems with electoral accountability 
There are many problems though if one relies on elections alone to ensure accountability. Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes (1999) highlight the institutional features that are required for citizens to 
have an effective control over politicians. They highlight the problem of targeting thousand targets 
with a single arrow’ Analogously, an economic voter has only one aggregated vote to convey his 
approval or disapproval of the incumbent’s performance on the economy. ‘Information 
asymmetry’ emerges as one of the factors that especially hinders the accountability model, 
especially if voters are not aware of the incentives that elected representatives have. This concern 
is also reiterated by the scholarship on economic voting, when it highlights the possible differences 
between the objective economic conditions and the subjective economic conditions. Further, there 
are limitations on the applications of the principal-agent approach for understanding 
accountability, especially with the normative values associated with it.  
Olsen (2013) argues against the lack of applicability of a principal-agent model, especially in ‘non-
settled’ polities with ‘contested’ institutions such as European Union (EU). These limitations of 
principal-agent approach could be seen in southern European democracies during economic crisis, 
where there were at least two principals, the domestic citizens and the EU. Philip (2009) on the 
other hand warns against the normative overload associated with a principal-agent model and 
highlights the ways accountability can reduce the scope of discretion or independent agency for 
politicians. This concern might affect the decision-makers to be concerned about the economy 
primarily during the final phase before elections, in order to cater to the voters, irrespective of the 
voters’ best interests. Further, as highlighted by Lewis-beck and Paldam (2000), there is evidence 
to suggest that economic evaluations are often myopic, especially in the run up to the elections.  
Irrespective of these concerns, the ability of voters to punish the incumbents is nonetheless crucial 
for any theory of democracy. This normative position stems from the value judgement attached 
with the sentiment that voters who are dissatisfied with incumbents should have an ability to ‘throw 
the rascals out’ (Vowles, 1999). This is precisely what the conventional normative theories of 
democracies miss out, and why an accountability theory of democracy is needed.  However, the 
central problem with electoral accountability—that this thesis is focused on—is the way it affects 
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the performance of a polity to achieve other normative value of ‘congruence’. If voters (especially 
those who voted for incumbents) seek to punish the incumbents, do they have to compromise on 
ideological congruence? 
To summarize the chapter, the conventional normative theories of democracy do not have an 
explicit appeal to value of accountability. An accountability theory of democracy that encompasses 
different types of accountabilities could emerge as an alternative theory. Electoral accountability 
(through economic voting) could be one of the direct applications of such theory of democracy. 
However, there are multiple issues with such electoral accountability. This thesis is interested in 
the consequences of economic voting on other democratic value – congruence. The next chapter 
provides an overview on how economic voting has been examined, and the impact of economic 

















3 ECONOMIC VOTING 
This chapter underlines the central hypothesis examining the impact of economic voting on the 
ideological congruence. It starts with a brief historical overview on how economic voting emerged 
as the first sub-field in studies on electoral accountability. The second section outlines the broad 
contours of the studies on economic voting, followed by the gaps in the scholarship on economic 
voting. The final section outlines the reasoning for my hypothesis by examining the consequences 
of economic voting on other normative democratic value of representation.  
3.1 History of economic voting as electoral accountability 
This section outlines the origins of how economic conditions emerged as the parameters on which 
the voters could hold the incumbents accountable. The history of economic voting can be arguably 
located with the USA-centric works of scholars like Gosnell and Colman (1940), Kramer (1971), 
Fiorina (1981) and Key (1966) on understanding the role of national economic conditions in US 
presidential and legislative elections. Harold Gosnell through his multiple studies— Gosnell and 
Gill, 1935; Gosnell and Schimdt, 1936; Gosnell and Pearson, 1939; Gosnell and Cohen, 1940; 
Gosnell and Coleman 1940; Gosnell, 1942 (cited in Achen and Bartels (2016, p. 96) —arguably 
laid the foundation for the retrospective theory of voting. He examined the impact of personal 
economic conditions of the electorate on the final electoral outcomes. Similar studies were later 
undertaken by Gerald Kramer (1971) where he analyzed the relationship between natural 
economic conditions and the national congressional vote for 34 biennial elections from 1896–
1934. He found strong correlation between the economic conditions and the electoral outcomes in 
congressional elections. 
V. O. Key (1966) examined the changes in various parameters such as support for compulsory old-
age insurance in 1936, Labor act of 1956, Korean war of 1952, etc. to gauge the shift in support 
for the incumbent government. This alternate view also termed as ‘retrospective theory of voting’ 
was given further boost when Fiorina Morris (1981, p.5) argued that retrospective voters need not 
know the precise economic or foreign policies… citizens need only calculate the changes in their 
own welfare. Fiorina analyzed the presidential and congressional elections by conducting panel 
surveys to understand the shift in voter support for incumbents, using distinct socio-political and 
economic parameters like opinion on war, satisfaction with president’s performance, and personal 
economic conditions. This retrospective theory of voting reduced the burden off the citizens to act 
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as ‘well-informed’ electorate, which the folk theory of democracy advocates. It is roughly at this 
stage that the link between economic conditions and support for incumbents through a chain of 
electoral accountability was established. The scholarship on economic voting has subsequently 
quite broadened with a considerable academic consensus over its features. For example, Lewis 
Beck and Paldam (2000) in their review of studies on economic voting identify nine broad 
characteristics of the vote-popularity function of the economy, as summarized in the Table 3.1 
below. 
Table 3.1: Features of vote-popularity function (Source: Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000) 
1 Vote and popularity functions are basically similar, but the fit of popularity functions is 
better. 
2 E-fraction: economic changes explain about one-third of the change in vote. 
3 The big two: The voters reacts to few macroeconomic variables–mainly unemployment, 
growth and inflation. 
4 Voters are myopic and so have a short time horizon for evaluations. 
5 Socio-tropic/ego-tropic controversy: Socio-tropic (national) economic voting is stronger 
than ego-tropic(personal) voting. 
6 Retrospective/Prospective controversy: Voters react to past events more than to expected 
events. 
7 Grievance asymmetry: Voters may react more to negative changes than the corresponding 
positive ones. 
8 Little is known about the macroeconomic knowledge of voters. 
9 Instability problem: The main problem in the v-p function literature is that it lacks 




The research on economic voting has subsequently been picked up in different countries. There 
are studies that now engage in unpacking relatively complex and sophisticated mechanisms of 
accountability. Perhaps with the COVID-19 pandemic and economic downturn, it is important to 
outline the studies that have also examined how contextual conditions such as economic crisis in 
Europe can accentuate the economic vote (Rattinger and Steinbrecher, 2011; Lewis-Beck and 
Nadeau, 2012; Hernandes and Kriesi, 2015; Talving, 2018). I will now summarize the more 






3.2 Conventional economic voting studies 
Lewis Beck and Stegmaier (2019) providing the most contemporary account of the scholarship on 
economic voting estimate that there are more than 600 studies in this sub-field. The various 
branches of this scholarship examine specific characteristics of this voting behavior. For example, 
there are studies that unpack if the economic vote is prospective or retrospective, ego-tropic or 
socio-tropic (Sigelman et al. 1991, Michelitch et al. 2012). Further, there are studies that examine 
its stability over a period of time and across countries as varied as Sweden (Martinsson, 2013), 
Argentina (Remmer and Gelineau, 2003), Canada (Anderson, 2006). The recent scholarship has 
also examined the sub-national and local elections for economic voting (Kukolowiz and Gorecki, 
2017; Hopkins and Pettingil, 2015). The relatively non-conventional scholarship has also looked 
at the socio-economic profile of voters such as gender (Kam, 2009) and voters employed in 
informal sector (Singer, 2016). Contextual factors such as party system, clarity of responsibility, 
global economic integration are most widely studied to understand the strength of economic 
voting. For example, Duch and Stevenson (2008) examine the prevalence and nature of economic 
voting in 18 western European countries from 1979-2001 and conclude that economic voting is 
indeed pervasive, although with varied strength depending upon institutional variations. They 
identify extent of political control over the economy, concentration of policy making 
responsibility, and the pattern of contestation among parties for policy making as the three factors 
that shape economic vote (2008, p. 358). To provide a systemic account, the studies on economic 
voting can be broadly approached from following five distinct (although overlapping) vantage 
points. 
a) Concept oriented: These studies are typically concerned with the right way for breaking 
down the phenomenon of the ‘incumbent support’ and the ‘economy’ into appropriate 
concepts. Some of the ways in which incumbent support can be conceptualized are vote-
share for the prime-minister or president’s party, vote-share for the incumbent government, 
vote-share for the incumbent party that holds the finance ministry, vote-share for the 
incumbent coalition, popularity of the incumbent party, and the voting intention of citizens. 
Economy on the other hand is typically conceptualized through macroeconomic concepts 
of inflation, unemployment rate, and GDP growth rate. For example, Bengtsson (2004) 
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analyzed the elections in 21 western parliamentary democracies between 1950–1997 using 
unemployment and inflation as the independent variables, and the change in ‘electoral 
results for all the parties in the government’ to capture the support for incumbents. On the 
other hand, Whitten and Palmer (1999) building on Powell and Whitten (1993)’s work 
examined economic voting by emphasizing on importance of ‘relative economic growth’ 
as an independent variable. 
 
b) Operationalization oriented: Having broadly identified the concepts, these studies are 
focused on the operationalizations of these concepts. Distinction between macro level 
(such as aggregate vote-share or GDP) and micro level (individual vote or intention to vote, 
and economic perceptions at an individual level) are one of the major fault lines in 
economic voting. The other dominant dimensions that are typically examined in such 
studies are whether the voting is prospective or retrospective, and whether the voting is 
socio-tropic or egocentric. A comprehensive summary of such characteristics of the 
relation is provided by Nannestad and Paldam (1994) in their review of studies on 
economic voting. It was later followed up in Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) and Lewis-
Beck and Stegamier (2013). 
 
c) Space-time oriented: These are the studies that measure the strength of relation during 
selected epochs or countries. Along with country-specific works such as United States 
(Kramer, 1971; Fiorinia, 1978; Tufte 1978; Kiewiet, 1983), Portugal (Friere and Santana- 
Pereira, 2012), France (Belanger and Lewis Beck 2004; Nadeau, Foucault, and Lewis-
Beck, 2010), there have also been comparative studies such as Roberts (2008) for central 
and eastern Europe, Lewis-Beck (1986), Powell and Whitten (1993), Duch and Stevenson 
(2010) for countries of western Europe, and Wilkin, Haller and Northpoth (1997) for a 
relatively heterogenous pool of countries. 
 
d) Third/intervening variables-oriented: These are studies that tend to examine the possible 
indirect effects of intervening variables on the economic vote. Some of the most common 
variables that are explored are existence of clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten, 
1993; Royed, Leden and Borreli, 2000; Anderson 2000), political context such as 
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multilevel governance (Anderson 2006), international economic integration (Costa Lobo 
and Lewis-Beck, 2012; Hellwig 2011), welfare protection (Pacek and Radcliffe, 1995; Park 
and Shin, 2019), age of democracy (Bochsler and Hanni, 2018), recession (Talving, 2018; 
Giulani and Massari, 2017) and impact of crisis (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2011) . 
 
e) Explanation oriented: These studies try to unpack the causal mechanism behind economic 
voting. Examining the role of voter as a rational (or non-rational) actor, these studies 
(Suzuki, 1991; Suzuki and Chappell, 1996) examine the voters’ awareness of economic 
constraints. Studies like Aidt (2000) also examines the extent of ignorance about the 
economy among average voters and elite voters. 
 
3.3 Gaps in scholarship on economic voting 
One of the common themes across the aforementioned types of studies is that economic vote is 
often studied in explanatory or descriptive fashion to examine prevalence, strength, stability, and 
intervening factors. This thesis takes a distinct and novel approach by taking economic voting as 
the starting point and explains the impact of economic voting on the ideological congruence. The 
contribution of the thesis to the literature is that it subverts the classical trope of studying economic 
vote and conceptualizes it as an independent variable. There are few studies though that have 
guided my approach. 
Steirs (2019) provides an initial pathway in expanding the horizon of retrospective voting beyond 
government. He argues that retrospective voting could work on the level of political parties, and 
that voters not only evaluate the performance of the government but also of the political party that 
they voted for. Further, Steirs and Dassoneville (2020) examine the effect of ideological 
polarization on the economic vote. They evaluate competing hypotheses of whether ideological 
polarization between parties strengthens retrospective voting (clarity of responsibility framework) 
or whether the ideological closeness strengthens retrospective voting (valence voting framework). 
My thesis subverts this argument partially and examines the ‘effect’ of retrospective voting instead 
of its ‘causes’. Rather than the focusing on how economic vote is affected by ideological distance 
between parties, I examine how economic vote affects ideological congruence between parties and 




With respect to the party-voter congruence and economic voting, Traber et al. (2017) examine the 
effect of the economic crisis on the ‘issue salience’ between parties and voter. They argue that 
issue salience rather than ideological congruence is more informative in understanding the voter 
behavior. Further, they also differentiate between the incumbent and opposition parties, by arguing 
that they have different incentives to appeal on economic issues. This also informs my thesis’s 
point of differentiating between levels of ideological congruence between incumbent parties and 
non-incumbent (opposition) parties. However, while Traber et al. (2017) examine the ‘issue 
salience’ between parties and voters during economic crisis, this thesis focusses on ‘ideological 
congruence’ during economic vote.  Let me now outline the rationale behind examining the impact 
of economic voting on ideological congruence. 
3.4 Rationale and Hypothesis: 
The literature on economic voting posits that the punishment for incumbents for worsening 
economic conditions is typically understood through a decrease in popularity or vote-share of the 
incumbent political party. If the ‘punishment’ is assumed as decrease in vote-share of the 
incumbent parties, it would imply that there is an increase in vote-share of the non-incumbent 
parties. However, the ideological preferences of the voters who have shifted their vote from the 
incumbent to non-incumbents might not necessarily match with the ideological positions of the 
non-incumbent parties they have voted for. If the voters are indeed punishing the incumbents for 
the worsening economic conditions, it would be logical to expect that they are voting for the party 
that is better suited for improving the economic conditions. This might imply that ideological 
congruence takes a backseat for these voters and that economic conditions are the primary rationale 
for vote-shift. This leads to my hypothesis that—When voters punish the incumbents for worsening 
economic conditions, the ideological congruence for incumbent parties increases as compared to 
their congruence in the previous elections. This hypothesis is based on two core assumptions, a) 
that the parties and the voters that are punishing do not substantially change their own ideological 
preferences over period of subsequent elections, b) that voters are not abstaining from elections as 
a punishment.  
An immediate objection to this argument would be on grounds of endogeneity. To expand, it could 
be that the economic voting is high when voters are less ideologically attached to their parties. 
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However, it might be far-fetched to argue that all the punishing voters (as operationalized by this 
research design) are ideologically distant from incumbent parties. To address this concern 
however, closeness to parties can be hold as a control variable to check for the possible effects of 
partisanship on vote-switching. In other words, if my hypothesis holds true, both punishing voters 
who were ideologically closer to incumbent parties as well as punishing voters who were not 
ideologically closer to the incumbent parties will have to compromise on their attachment with 
incumbent party in order ‘to punish’ the incumbents. In the next chapter, we examine how 




















 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
This chapter outlines the research design used to examine my hypothesis. It starts with an overview 
of the data that was used for testing the hypothesis. It then describes the way in which the key 
concepts –punishing voters and ideological congruence–are operationalized. There are two 
arguments that are being examined through these concepts. I start from the argument that the 
economy drives support for incumbents. The second argument is that the ideological congruence 
between the incumbent parties and their voters is affected by the strength of this relation between 
the economy and vote. I conceptualize economic voting through the category of ‘punishing’ voters. 
This allows me to link these two arguments. The final section of this chapter highlights the 
emergent findings from the data analysis.  
4.1 Description of data 
The data from integrated module dataset (IMD) and the previous modules (3rd and 4th) collected 
by Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) was used to test my hypothesis. CSES is a 
research project that is jointly administered by the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Michigan and the GESIS – Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences in Germany. This project seeks 
to create transnational datasets of voter behavior by compiling national election studies of 
countries across the world. While there are valuable alternate data sources with cross-national 
electoral studies such as European Values Survey, European Social Survey, World Values Survey, 
Euro/Asian/American/Afro barometers, etc.; CSES dataset offered two advantages with the 
research question at hand. It first provided me pre-coded variables on vote-switching and voting 
for incumbents. Second, it allowed me to compare electoral systems beyond Europe. The CSES 
integrated module dataset covers 174 elections in 55 polities from 1996–2016. The fourth round 
of the CSES collected data for 45 elections in 39 polities between 2011–2016, with a total of 
75,558 observations. While the third round of CSES collected data for 50 elections in 41 polities 
between 2006–2011 with a total of 80,163 observations. Apart from Peru, the surveys for the rest 
of the countries were conducted as post poll or pre-election studies. This reduced the probability 
of shift in the vote choice of the respondents at the time of elections. This is also reflected when 
we compare the CSES data with the actual vote share. As seen from the Table 4.1, the vote share 
for the incumbents during the fourth round of the CSES study was often below the actual vote 
share of the incumbent governed.  
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1 Argentina (2015) 45 14 49 Front for the victory  
2 Australia (2013) 32 2 32 Labor party 
3 Austria (2013) 42 24 51 Social Democratic party + Austrian People Party 
4 Brazil (2014) 41 11 52 Workers Party  
5 Bulgaria (2014) 21 39 33 Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
6 Canada (2015) 17 40 32 Conservative Party 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 4 40 7 Christian Democratic Union - Czech People's 
Party 
 
8 Finland (2015) 30 25 44 National Coalition Party 
9 France (2012) 18 13 27 UPM 
10 Germany (2013) 33 22 42 Christian Democratic Union 
11 Great Britain (2015) 56 21 45 Conservative + Liberal Democrats 
12 Greece (2015) 10 24 28 New Democracy  
13 Iceland (2013) 23 17 24 Social Democratic Alliance 
14 Ireland (2011) 14 14 36 Fianna Fail 
15 Israel (2013) 32 30 41 Israel forward 
16 Japan (2013) 39 24 49 Liberal Democratic Party + New Komeito Party 
17 Latvia (2011/14) 32 27 38 LVA Unity 
18 Mexico (2012/15) 23 18 34 National action party, IRP 
19 Montenegro (2012) 39 32 46 MNE-Coalition for Eu Montenegro 
20 New Zealand (2014) 35 26 47 National party 
21 Norway (2013) 35 14 41 Labor Party 
22 Philippines (2016) 11 17 23 Liberal party 
23 Poland (2011) 29 45 47 Civic Platform 
24 Portugal (2015) 22 42 37 Portugal ahead 
25 R. Korea (2012) 35 26 43 New frontier party 
26 Romania (2014) NA NA NA PSD+UNPR+PC alliance 
27 Serbia (2012) 20 45 36 Democratic Party+ SPS-PUPS-JS 
28 Slovakia (2016) 24 35 29  Direction Social Democracy 
29 Slovenia (2011) 9 45 19 Social Democrats + Zares + LDS+ deSUS 
30 South Africa (2014) 42 37 62 African National Congress 
31 Sweden (2014) 38 5 39 Moderates 
32 Taiwan (2012) 46 21 52 Kuomintang 
33 Thailand (2011) 32 12 35 Democrat party 
34 Turkey (2015) 35 37 50 Justice and Development party 
35 USA (2012) 48 30 51 Democratic party 
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Most of the variance can however be explained by considering the proportion of those whose vote-
choice could not be identified. I make an assumption here that half of the ‘don’t know’/’can’t say’ 
could go to the incumbent. In such a case, the discrepancy between CSES vote-share for incumbent 
and the actual vote share falls within a reasonable 5 percent margin. It is only in case of the United 
Kingdom’s election in 2015, that the CSES vote share exceeds the actual vote share by about ten 
points.  
However, the discrepancy could affect the ideological congruence between parties and voter. Thus, 
I examine if the mystery voters—whose vote could not be ascertained— are closer to any party as 
compared to those who revealed their vote for or against incumbents. From Table 4.2, it can be 
seen that for the 39 countries in the fourth round, the mystery voters are almost half as likely to be 
close to any party as compared to those who have revealed their vote-choice. Further, their self-
positioning on average is similar to those who voted against incumbents and is 0.4 points to the 
left of the mean incumbent voter. This tilt of self-positioning towards anti-incumbent voters could 
affect my interpretations of changes in ideological congruence due to punishing voters. However, 
a similar ideological profile of voters was also seen in third round of CSES (Table 4.3). The 
proportion of these mystery voters in both the rounds was similar with 9.8 percent in 3rd round 
and 9.8 percent in 4th round. Thus, I ignore the aggregate effect of these mystery voters on the 
ideological congruence between incumbent parties and voters.  
Table 4.2: Profile of Mystery voters in 4th round of CSES 
 Are you close to any party? self-position on L–R scale 
 No (%) Yes (%) Mean Std 
Voted against incumbents 47 46 5.4 2.5 
Voted for incumbents 39 53 5.9 2.5 
Don’t know/can’t say 62 24 5.5 2.4 
 
Table 4.3: Profile of Mystery voters in 3rd round of CSES 
 Are you close to any party? self-position on L–R scale 
 No (%) Yes (%) Mean Std 
Voted against incumbents 20 20 5.4 2.6 
Voted for incumbents 18 17 5.8 2.5 
Don’t know/can’t say 41 13 5.4 2.2 
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The choice of polities is limited by including those countries that have been covered in both rounds. 
Further, I choose only those countries for which the disaggregated data of voters on their 
preference for incumbents or anti-incumbents is readily available. This removed Hongkong, Peru, 
Switzerland, and Kenya from my sample set, reducing the polities to 35. In most of these 35 
countries, the incumbents lost the office of PM (or president) in the fourth round, as evident from 
the data in the Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Party of PM (or President, where presidential/semi-presidential system) during 
fourth round of CSES 
S. No. Country Before fourth round After fourth round 
1 Argentina (2015) Front for the victory Let’s change 
2 Australia (2013) Labor party Liberal party 
3 Austria (2013) * Social Democratic party Social Democratic party 
4 Brazil (2014) * Workers Party Workers Party 
5 Bulgaria* (2014) Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria Citizens for European Development 
of Bulgaria 
6 Canada (2015)  Conservative Party Conservative Party, Liberal Party 
7 Czech Republic* (2013) Party of citizens’ rights Zemanites Party of citizens’ rights 
8 Finland (2015) National Coalition Party Centre party 
9 France (2012) UPM Socialist Party 
10 Germany (2013) * Christian Democratic Union Christian Democratic Union 
11 Great Britain (2015) Conservative Conservative 
12 Greece (2012, 2015) New Democracy  Coalition of the radical left (2) 
13 Iceland (2013) Social Democratic Alliance  the consolidation 
14 Ireland (2011) Fianna Fail  fine gael 
15 Israel (2013) * Israel forward Israel forward 
16 Japan (2013) * Liberal Democratic Party Liberal Democratic Party 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) * Unity  unity (2) 
18 Mexico (2012, 2015) * National action party, Institutional Revolutionary Party, Institutional Revolutionary Party (2) 
19 Montenegro (2012)  Coalition for Eu Mon Coalition for Eu Mon 
20 New Zealand (2011 
2014) * 
National party National party (2) 
21 Norway (2013) Labor Party Conservative party 
22 Philippines (2016) Liberal party Filipino Democratic party 
23 Poland (2011) * Civic Platform Civic platform 
24 Portugal (2015) Portugal ahead Socialist party 
25 Republic of Korea 
(2012) * 
New frontier party New frontier Party 
26 Romania (2012, 2014)  PSD+UNPR+PC alliance Social Liberal Union, 
PSD+UNPR+PC alliance 
27 Serbia (2012) Democratic Party Socialist party of Serbia 
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28 Slovakia (2016) * SVK Direction Social Democracy SVK Direction Social Democracy 
29 Slovenia (2011)  Social Democrats Slovenian Democratic party 
30 South Africa (2014) * African National Congress African National Congress 
31 Sweden (2014) Moderates Social Democratic workers party 
32 Taiwan (2012) *  Kuomintang  Kuomintang 
33 Thailand (2011) Democrat party For Thais Party 
34 Turkey (2015) * Justice and Development party Justice and Development party 
35 USA (2012) * Democratic party Democratic party 
Note: * represents countries, where incumbents have retained power. 
There are 18 countries where the incumbents have managed to stay in power. These are Austria, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Montenegro, New 
Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, South Africa, Turkey, Taiwan, and USA. Thus, I 
evaluate my claims of changes in ideological congruence primarily using these 18 countries. For 
the countries, where incumbents have lost power, the disaggregated data of vote choice within the 
anti-incumbents (who are now in opposition) is not readily available, and hence I focus only on 
the congruence levels between the incumbent parties and their voters. This underlines the point 
that I am not treating incumbents and anti-incumbents as a two-party model, as many countries 
have multi-party systems (Appendix 1). 
4.2 Punishing voters  
This thesis focusses on economic voting from a specific perspective of punishing voters. Despite 
considering Mansbridge’s (2014) approach against using punishing as accountability, this thesis 
precisely does the reverse. This is because I am primarily interested in exploring the effects on 
ideological congruence when voters punish the incumbents by switching their votes. 
I define ‘punishing voters’ as the subset of electorate who have previously voted for incumbent 
parties. They are dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbents for worsening economic 
conditions and would punish the incumbents by switching their votes from incumbents to non-
incumbents. ‘Punishing voters’ in other words, are the first manifestation of the economic voting. 
Since I am interested in exploring the consequences of the economic voting, there are two relations 
that I wish to examine. First is the effect of the economy on voting for incumbents, that I call 
economic vote. The second is the effect of this economic vote on the ideological congruence 
between parties and voters.   
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This way of operationalization effectively implies that ‘punishing’ of the incumbents can only 
happen by those who have previously voted for incumbents. This approach does not consider the 
‘punishing’ ability of the voters of non-incumbent parties, as they did not vote for the incumbent 
parties in the first place. So even, if they do continue to vote against incumbents, it would not be 
reasonable to classify them as ‘punishing’. In this sense, the idea of ‘punishing’ voters is 
intrinsically tied to the idea of switching voters—those who are switching their votes from 
incumbents to non-incumbents. Similar logic can be applied for the concept of ‘rewarding’ voters. 
However, I do not explore the ‘rewarding voters’, as the proportion of such voters is relatively 
very less. 
The data from integrated module of CSES allows me to locate the voters who had voted for 
incumbents in past. I compute this data by using the overlap between the categories of voters who 
have switched their votes, and voters who have voted for incumbents in the current elections. This 
is better explained through the following equation. Let those who have voted for incumbents in 
previous elections be classified as I1 and those who have voted for incumbents in the current 
elections be I2, while anti-incumbent voters of the previous elections are A1, and anti-incumbent 
voters in the current elections are A2. Switch is captured by S1, while non-switch is S0. I1 is then 
calculated using,  
I1 = I2 * S0 + A2*S1 
 (I2*S0 = I1’ and A2*S1= A1)  
I1’ is the voters who have stayed with the incumbents in both previous and current elections. A1 
are the punishing voters, who have switched from incumbents to non-incumbent parties in the 
current elections. It is due to the switching of these voters that I expect a change in ideological 
congruence levels for the incumbent and non-incumbent parties and their voters. Table 4.5 







Table 4.5 Proportion of switching voters and voters of incumbent parties 
S. 
No 




CSES vote for 
incumbent govt 
CSES vote against 
incumbent govt 
1 Argentina (2015) 36 20 45 41 
2 Australia (2013) 66 18 32 66 
3 Austria (2013) 49 17 42 34 
4 Brazil (2014) 40 21 41 47 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 40 11 21 40 
6 Canada (2011/15) 34 16 20 40 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 25 19 4 56 
8 Finland (2015) 46 18 30 43 
9 France (2012) 40 32 18 63 
10 Germany (2013) 50 18 33 45 
11 Great Britain (2015) 47 20 56 23 
12 Greece (2015) 31 26 10 26 
13 Iceland (2013) 35 31 23 60 
14 Ireland (2011) 38 22 14 69 
15 Israel (2013) 27 26 32 37 
16 Japan (2013) NA NA 39 37 
17 Latvia (2011/14) 32 21 32 38 
18 Mexico (2012/15) NA NA 23 61 
19 Montenegro (2012) 44 14 39 29 
20 New Zealand (2014) 46 15 44 40 
21 Norway (2013) 50 24 35 51 
22 Philippines (2016) NA NA 11 71 
23 Poland (2011) 32 10 29 26 
24 Portugal (2015) 37 6 22 36 
25 R. Korea (2012) 37 12 35 39 
26 Romania (2014) 25 10 30 15 
27 Serbia (2012) 16 28 20 37 
28 Slovakia (2016) 32 15 24 40 
29 Slovenia (2011) 20 20 9 46 
30 South Africa (2014) 44 5 42 21 
31 Sweden (2014) 52 28 38 57 
32 Taiwan (2012) NA NA 46 33 
33 Thailand (2011) 24 46 32 56 
34 Turkey (2015) 57 6 35 46 
35 USA (2012) 52 4 48 23 
Table 4.6 provides an overview of those voters who had previously voted for incumbents. Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and South Africa stand out, with more than three fourths of the 
previous incumbent voters switching their votes. Apart from these four countries, there is a 
considerable variation in the proportion of punishing voters to examine my arguments reasonably. 
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Table 4.6 Proportion of potential punishing voters 
S. No Countries  Voters who continued to vote for incumbents 
(percent) 
Punishing voters - who switched from 
incumbents to non-incumbents. 
 (percent) 
N 
1 Argentina (2015) 64 36 704 
2 Australia (2013) 64 36 1598 
3 Austria (2013) 72 28 484 
4 Brazil (2014) 39 61 1525 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 64 36 283 
6 Canada (2011, 2015) 52 48 2240 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 11 89 334 
8 Finland (2015) 64 36 586 
9 France (2012) 37 63 943 
10 Germany (2013) 66 34 661 
11 Great Britain (2015) 79 21 778 
12 Greece (2015) 48 52 403 
13 Iceland (2013) 37 63 614 
14 Ireland (2011) 39 61 621 
15 Israel (2013) 49 51 375 
16 Japan (2013) NA NA NA 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) 56 44 640 
18 Mexico (2012, 2015) NA NA NA 
19 Montenegro (2012) 75 25 422 
20 New Zealand (2014) 72 28 896 
21 Norway (2013) 58 42 754 
22 Philippines (2016) NA NA NA 
23 Poland (2011) 24 76 481 
24 Portugal (2015) 79 21 323 
25 R. Korea (2012) 71 28 323 
26 Romania (2014) 82 18 545 
27 Serbia (2012) 36 64 640 
28 Slovakia (2016) 58 42 381 
29 Slovenia (2011) 26 74 276 
30 South Africa (2014) 13 86 504 
31 Sweden (2014) 45 55 363 
32 Taiwan (2012) NA NA NA 
33 Thailand (2011) 36 64 995 
34 Turkey (2015) 86 14 375 
35 USA (2012) 94 6 760 





The ideological congruence between the incumbent government and voters is also affected by 
voters who have switched from non-incumbents to incumbents. However, in only 5 out of the total 
35 countries, the proportion of voters with positive evaluations exceed those with negative 
evaluations. If the economic conditions indeed drive support for incumbents, then the ideological 
congruence affected by this support would be marginal as compared to the congruence affected by 
the shift away from incumbents. As seen from Table 4.7, in almost 20 countries, the proportion of 
voters who shifted their voters from non-incumbents to incumbents is below ten percent. The 
average shift towards incumbents is 16 percent, while the average shift away from incumbents is 
41 percent. Hence, I expect ideological congruence between the incumbent parties and voters to 
be driven more by the voters who shift away from incumbents. 
Table 4.7 Proportion of potential rewarding voters 
S. No Countries  Voters who continued to vote for non- 
incumbents (percent) 
Rewarding voters - who switched from non-
incumbents to incumbents. 
 (percent) 
N 
1 Argentina (2015) 79 21 733 
2 Australia (2013) 96 3 2721 
3 Austria (2013) 89 11 381 
4 Brazil (2014) 82 17 1791 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 94 6 424 
6 Canada (2011, 2015) 93/96 7/4 1354/1894 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 99 1 933 
8 Finland (2015) 91 9 736 
9 France (2012) 97 3 1312 
10 Germany (2013) 92 7 926 
11 Great Britain (2015) 77 23 465 
12 Greece (2015) 96 4 556 
13 Iceland (2013) 95 5 936 
14 Ireland (2011) 97 3 1321 
15 Israel (2013) 83 17 456 
16 Japan (2013) 48 52 1473 
17 Latvia (2011/14) 91/72 9/28 449 
18 Mexico (2012/15) 78/60 22/40 2054/976 
19 Montenegro (2012) 92 8 303 
20 New Zealand (2011/14) 86/85 14/15 661/565 
21 Norway (2013) 93 7 945 
22 Philippines (2016) 86 14 994 
23 Poland (2011) 81 19 611 
24 Portugal (2015) 90 10 595 
25 R. Korea (2012) 82 18 481 
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26 Romania (2014) 64 35 792 
27 Serbia (2012) 91 9 642 
28 Slovakia (2016) 91 9 504 
29 Slovenia (2011) 97 3 490 
30 South Africa (2014) 276 105 381 
31 Sweden (2014) 92 8 516 
32 Taiwan (2012) 41 58 1435 
33 Thailand (2011) 92 7 909 
34 Turkey (2015) 91 9 544 
35 USA (2012) 71 29 618 
 Average 84 16 34834 
 
Let me now examine the effect of economic evaluations on these punishing voters. The question 
on the state of the economy used in the CSES data provides subjective retrospective evaluations 
of the economy in the past year (Table 4.8). The scale of the economy that goes from good to 
worse is unchanged in my analysis. The dependent variable of punishing voters is binary with 1 
representing a switch in vote choice from incumbents to non-incumbents. 
Table 4.8 Economic evaluations   
S. No Countries  Economy got better Economy stayed the 
same 
Economy got worse 
1 Argentina (2015) 15 36 49 
2 Australia (2013) 27 44 27 
3 Austria (2013) 13 52 32 
4 Brazil (2014) 23 47 28 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 7 49 42 
6 Canada (2011/15) 18 40 38 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 6 43 45 
8 Finland (2015) 4 30 64 
9 France (2012) 3 15 80 
10 Germany (2013) 20 62 14 
11 Great Britain (2015) 40 30 27 
12 Greece (2015) 4 14 81 
13 Iceland (2013) 38 43 12 
14 Ireland (2011) 4 14 72 
15 Israel (2013) 13 29 55 
16 Japan (2013) 15 67 17 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) 16 50 31 
18 Mexico (2012, 2015) 21 34 43 
19 Montenegro (2012)    
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20 New Zealand 
(2011/14) 
28 25 39 
21 Norway (2013) 16 75 7 
22 Philippines 24 68 6 
23 Poland (2011) 17 42 36 
24 Portugal (2015) 13 34 51 
25 R. Korea (2012) 4 36 56 
26 Romania (2014) 8 58 30 
27 Serbia (2012) 6 38 55 
28 Slovakia (2016) 12 62 23 
29 Slovenia (2011) 3 11 83 
30 South Africa (2014) 21 34 39 
31 Sweden (2014) 25 50 16 
32 Taiwan (2012) 17 37 43 
33 Thailand (2011) 15 28 47 
34 Turkey (2015) 12 32 53 
35 USA (2012) 32 40 28 
 
Table 4.9 represents the binary logistic regression models to explain the proportion of punishing 
vote across all the 35 countries. First, I use a bi-variate model to examine the relation between 
economic evaluations and the propensity to punish. This demonstrates that the relation between 
economic evaluations and vote switching is statistically significant and in positive direction. 
Further, the disaggregated way of asking the question on state of the economy allows me to check 
the variations in symmetry of the economic voting.  It turns out that there is an asymmetry with 
the rise in negative evaluations of the economy having a relatively stronger impact than the decline 
in positive evaluations. Further, even after accounting for party attachment, the relation between 



















Economic voting (general) 0.304*** 0.249*** 0.238*** 
Economic voting 
(better) 
0.311*** — — 
Economic voting 
(worse) 
0.394*** — — 
Age  -0.146*** -0.127*** 
Gender  -0.061 -0.073 
Household income  -0.045*** -0.042*** 
Religiosity   -0.343*** -0.324*** 
Education  0.078*** 0.084*** 
Self-ideological position   -0.129*** -0.128*** 
Closeness to any party   -0.723*** 
 For economic voting general 
 
 
Note: *** implies p < 0.01 
If we look at the strength of economic voting in the 18 countries where the incumbents have stayed 
in power, we find that retrospective socio-tropic economic evaluations do affect the inclination to 
switch votes from incumbent to anti-incumbents. In other words, when voters of the incumbent 
parties are dissatisfied with the national economic conditions, they are likely to switch their votes 
to non-incumbent parties. This demonstrates that the phenomenon of economic voting can also be 
observed through the concept of punishing voters.  As seen from Table 4.10, this relation holds 
even after controlling for party attachment, and ideological preferences of the incumbent voters.  
 
Cox and Snell R² 0.047 0.096 0.121 
Log likelihood 26447 10373.10 9977.57 
N 20569 8248 8110 
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Economic voting (general) -0.302*** -0.351*** -0.305*** 
Economic voting 
(worse) 
-0.628 — — 
Age — 0.004 -0.002 
Gender — 0.220*** 0.212*** 
Household income — -0.101*** -0.101*** 
Religiosity  — 0.007 -0.001 
Education — -0.001*** 0.084 
Self-ideological position  — 0.137*** 0.141*** 




Note: *** implies p < 0.01 
This establishes my argument, that the economic evaluations are one of the key factors that drive 
vote against incumbents among the voters of the incumbent government. This argument holds true 
even after accounting for the endogeneity argument. In other words, economic evaluations drive 
both partisan and non-partisan voters of the incumbent parties to non-incumbent parties. The 
second part of the argument concerns examining the effects of this punishing voters on the 





Cox and Snell R² 0.03 0.055 0.055 
Log likelihood 16407 5802.90 5610.03 
N 16719 6528 6360 
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4.3 Ideological congruence 
Ideological congruence from the perspective of my research question is understood as the distance 
between the ideological position of the parties and the ideological position of the voters. Let me 
state at the outset, that ideological congruence here is taken as a simplistic proxy measure of 
democratic value of ‘representation’. In other words, a lower incongruence between the ideological 
preferences of government with ideological preference of the median citizen is seen as ‘normative’ 
feature. There are many debates on the right way to measure the ideological congruence (see e.g., 
Powell, 2018; Warwick, 2016; Ferland, 2016; Powell 2009). These debates are largely about 
whether the proportional systems have performed better than majoritarian systems at congruence 
between government and median citizen. However, this is irrelevant from the perspective of my 
research question.  
Further, as Golder and Stramski (2010) highlight there are multiple ways to measure congruence 
depending upon a) whether the congruence is sought between a) one citizen or multiple citizens 
and b) one representative or multiple representatives. The most widely used approach is a 1:1 
approach, where the mean ideological position of one entity (cabinet/government/parliament) is 
plotted against the ideological position of one entity (median citizen). The other approach (many-
many) is where the distribution of ideological positions of the elected representatives are plotted 
against distribution of the ideological positions of the voters. 
Taking the former approach, I operationalize ideological congruence as the distance between mean 
ideological position of the incumbent parties and the self-reported ideological position of their 
voters. Further, since I am interested in the changes in ideological congruence, I look at the 
ideological congruence of the incumbent parties at the previous elections and at the current 
elections. Table 4.11 represents the ideological congruence between the incumbent parties and 
their voters for the countries included in the fourth round of CSES. The difference between the 
self-positioning of incumbent voter, and the ideological positioning of the incumbent party-choice 
by CSES experts is squared. The mean of this squares is captured by ideological incongruence. As 
the values for this incongruence rises, the voter of incumbent party is further away from the party 






Table 4.11 Ideological incongruence between incumbent parties and their voters 
S. No Countries  Ideological incongruence  
1 Argentina (2015) 7.70 
2 Australia (2013) 4.08 
3 Austria (2013) 4.19 
4 Brazil (2014) 19.35 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 5.10 
6 Canada (2011, 2015) 3.21 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 3 
8 Finland (2015) 3.62 
9 France (2012) 2.2 
10 Germany (2013) 3.38 
11 Great Britain (2015) 2.85 
12 Greece (2015) 3.79 
13 Iceland (2013) 3.85 
14 Ireland (2011) 3.56 
15 Israel (2013) 4.02 
16 Japan (2013) 5.94 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) 4.90 
18 Mexico (2012, 2015) 9.2 
19 Montenegro (2012) 15.62 
20 New Zealand (2011, 2014) 3.96 
21 Norway (2013) 3.80 
22 Philippines 16.91 
23 Poland (2011) 5.03 
24 Portugal (2015) 4.93 
25 Republic of Korea (2012) 5.81 
26 Romania (2014) 10.62 
27 Serbia (2012) 8.27 
28 Slovakia (2016) 7.27 
29 Slovenia (2011) 6.58 
30 South Africa (2014) 20.02 
31 Sweden (2014*) 1.95 
32 Taiwan (2012) — 
33 Thailand (2011) — 
34 Turkey (2015) 3.48 




One of the common counterarguments to the economic voting theory suggests that the partisan 
support shape the economic perceptions (Kayser and Welzein, 2011). In other words, the direction 
of the causal relation between the economy and support for incumbent could be reverse. This 
would imply that those who support the incumbents would have a positive evaluation of the 
economic conditions. It is thus the partisan attachment that shapes the economic perceptions. In 
order to control for this, I first examine whether the punishing voters (as defined earlier) identify 
themselves as close to any party as compared to the non-punishing voters of incumbent 
government. This is my first hypothesis H1. On the other hand, my second hypothesis H2 would 
be that the punishing voters are just as close any party as the non-punishing voters of incumbent 
government.  
H1: Punishing voters are less likely to be close to any political party compared to non-punishing 
incumbents’ voters.   
H2: Punishing voters are as likely to be close to any political party as non-punishing voters of 
incumbent parties.  
From table 4.12, it can be observed that punishing voters are generally less attached to any party 
as compared to non-punishing voters of the incumbent government. This difference is highest in 
Turkey, Norway, and Slovakia and almost null in Romania, Serbia, and Thailand. Thus, I fail to 
find support for the hypothesis H1, while the hypothesis H2 can be safely rejected. 
 
Table 4.12: Party attachment of punishing voters 
  Attached to any party 
S. No Countries  non-punishing voters 
of incumbent govt (%) 
Punishing voters of 
incumbent govt (%) 
Difference (%) 
1 Argentina (2015) 57 35 22 
2 Australia (2013) 92 80 12 
3 Austria (2013) 57 24 23 
4 Brazil (2014) 34 25 11 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 69 41 28 
6 Canada (2015) 25 16 9 
7 Czech Republic 
(2013) 
66 30 36 
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8 Finland (2015) 70 46 26 
9 France (2012) 67 57 10 
10 Germany (2013) 61 37 24 
11 Great Britain (2015) 69 47 22 
12 Greece (2015) 56 34 32 
13 Iceland (2013) 66 33 33 
14 Ireland (2011) 41 13 28 
15 Israel (2013) 58 38 20 
16 Japan (2013) NA 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) 66 58 4 
18 Mexico (2015)    
19 Montenegro (2012) 65 58 7 
20 New Zealand (2014) 65 57 8 
21 Norway (2013) 68 30 38 
22 Philippines (2016) NA 
23 Poland (2011) 54 41 13 
24 Portugal (2015) NA   
25 R. Korea (2012) 66 43 23 
26 Romania (2014) 45 46 -1 
27 Serbia (2012) 42 49 -7 
28 Slovakia (2016) 78 46 38 
29 Slovenia (2011) 23 17 6 
30 South Africa (2014) 80 68 12 
31 Sweden (2014) 62 43 19 
32 Taiwan (2012) NA 
33 Thailand (2011) 10 13 -3 
34 Turkey (2015) 87 47 40 
35 USA* (2012) 77 50 27 
 Average 59 37 22 
 
As we saw, punishing voters are less likely to be attached to any party as compared to non-
punishing old incumbent voters. However, their self-positioning on left-right scale might be 
different from the left-right positioning of the non-punishing incumbent voters. This gives me my 
third and fourth hypothesis. 
H3: The self-positioning of punishing voters on left-right scale is different from the self-positioning 
of non-punishing old incumbent voters on left-right scale. 
H4: The self-positioning of punishing voters on left-right scale is same as the self-positioning of 
non-punishing old incumbent voters on left-right scale. 
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If H3 is true, it would imply that had punishing voters not switched their votes, the incongruence 
of the incumbents would still be affected. Moreover, the proposition that it is their self-positioning 
on the left-right scale that drove their votes away cannot be discarded. However, if H4 is true, it 
would imply that the left-right scale might have a less role in punishing of the incumbents, and 
that punishing voters were forced to choose between retrospective evaluations or ideological 
congruence. 
Table 4.13: self-positioning of punishing vs non-punishing voters 
S. No Countries  Self-position of incumbent voters on 
left-right scale 
Self-position of punishing voters on left-right scale 
1 Argentina (2015) 5.47 5.80 
2 Australia (2013) 4.14 4.77 
3 Austria (2013) 4.94 4.58 
4 Brazil (2014) 4.94 4.58 
5 Bulgaria (2014) NA 
6 Canada (2015) 6.59 4.50 
7 Czech Republic (2013) 5.38 5.71 
8 Finland (2015) 6.44 5.40 
9 France (2012) 7.16 4.38 
10 Germany (2013) 5.51 4.2 
11 Great Britain (2015) 5.35 5.01 
12 Greece (2015) 6.61 4.37 
13 Iceland (2013) 3.72 5.55 
14 Ireland (2011) 6.64 5.91 
15 Israel (2013) 7.76 5.21 
16 Japan (2013) NA 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) 6.99 6.64 
18 Mexico (2015) NA 
19 Montenegro (2012) 6.59 4.8 
20 New Zealand (2014) 7.22 4.11 
21 Norway (2013) 4.06 6.28 
22 Philippines (2016) NA 
23 Poland (2011) 6.29 5.20 
24 Portugal (2015) 7.64 3.41 
25 R. Korea (2012) 7.26 4.27 
26 Romania (2014) 3.99 5.51 
27 Serbia (2012) 5.17 5.96 
28 Slovakia (2016) 3.02 6.02 
29 Slovenia (2011) 3.25 4.01 
30 South Africa (2014) 6.75 6.36 
31 Sweden (2014) 7.21 4.31 
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32 Taiwan (2012) NA 
33 Thailand (2011) NA 
34 Turkey (2015) 8.09 5.17 
35 USA* (2012) 6.14 6.15 
Total 5.81 5.22 
 
As seen from the Table 4.13, there is a substantial difference of 0.6 points on average between the 
self-ideological positioning of non-punishing voters and punishing voters of the incumbent parties. 
Thus, I fail to find support for Hypothesis H4. On the other hand, I find evidence in support for 
the hypothesis H3. If the self-ideological positioning of punishing voters is different from non-
punishing voters, then the ideological incongruence between incumbent parties and voters could 
be affected by it. 
To summarize my argument, I tested one proposition and four hypotheses: 
Proposition 1: As the economic evaluations worsen, the proportion to punish the incumbents by 
switching the votes from incumbent to non-incumbent rises. 
Based on this proposition, I examined following hypotheses— 
H1: Punishing voters are less likely to be close to any political party as compared to non-punishing 
incumbents’ voters.   
H2: Punishing voters are as likely to be close to any political party as compared to non-punishing 
voters of incumbent government.  
H3: The self-positioning of punishing voters on left-right scale is different from the self-positioning 
of non-punishing old incumbent voters on left-right scale. 
H4: The self-positioning of punishing voters on left-right scale is same as the self-positioning of 
non-punishing old incumbent voters on left-right scale. 
I reject hypothesis H2 and hypothesis H4. The difference in party attachment and left-right 
placement of the punishing voters as compared to the non-punishing voters of the incumbent 
parties is the mechanism through which I expect the punishing voters to affect the ideological 
congruence between incumbent parties and its voters. In other words, I argue that if there is a 
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stronger switch of punishing voters from incumbent to non-incumbent parties, then ideological 
incongruence of incumbent parties decreases. This is my fifth and final hypothesis.  
H5: Ideological incongruence between incumbent parties and their voters decreases with 
rise in economic voting. 
 
As denoted by the linear regression models in Table 4.14, I do find economic conditions to have 
an impact on the ideological incongruence between incumbent parties and their voters in the 
predicted direction. Further, the inclusion of self-ideological position and party attachment 
increase the model fit to up to 70%. However, even after including these parameters in the model, 
the economic conditions have a statistically significant effect on the ideological incongruence.  
Thus, the hypothesis H5 holds true.  




















Strength of Economic vote 
(general) 
-0.507*** -0.219*** 
Age -1.521*** -0.840*** 
Gender -0.320 -0.148 
Household income -0.194*** -0.431*** 
Religiosity  2.776*** 0.994*** 
Education -2.012*** -1.732*** 
Self-ideological position   6.265*** 
Closeness to any party  1.018*** 




As seen from the Table 4.14, economic voting conceptualized through ‘punishing voters’ affects 
the ideological congruence between the incumbent parties and their voters. In other words, as the 
punishing rises, there is also an increase in congruence between the incumbent parties and their 
voters. This implies that the congruence between incumbent parties and their voters is affected by 
the retrospective evaluations of the economic conditions. As the evaluations of the economic 
conditions worsens, the incumbent parties are likely to be more ideologically congruent with the 
ideological positions of the voters. I started my argument with the premise that economic voting 
can be conceptualized as vote-switching by voters from incumbent parties. Qualifying such 
economic voters as ‘punishing voters’, I found that these punishing voters are less likely to be 
attached to the incumbent party as compared to the non-punishing voters of the incumbent parties. 
Further, they are ideologically different from non-punishing voters. This is the mechanism through 

















This chapter starts by summarizing the claims made in this thesis. It highlights the way my 
arguments can be situated in the wider scholarship on electoral studies. It then proceeds to examine 
the limitations of this study. The final section examines the consequences of my arguments for 
electoral studies, and the emerging questions that this thesis poses. 
5.1 Summing up 
Elections are designed to serve multiple normative values in a democracy. As seen from the 
empirical studies on comparative democracies, there is consensus over at least two broad values – 
accountability and representation. Most of the empirical studies differentiate between electoral 
systems (and other democratic institutions) based on the expected normative value that they serve. 
Thus, majoritarian democracies are widely associated with stability, clarity, and a stronger link 
between government and voters. Proportional democracies on the other hand are associated with 
better ideological congruence and representation between parties and their voters. However, these 
empirical studies on comparative electoral systems and comparative democracies associate the 
features of the institutional design (Single Member Plurality District, Proportional Representation, 
etc.) with the normative democratic values. They do not investigate whether a single electoral 
institution (irrespective of the design) can serve both these normative values simultaneously. In 
other words, these studies argue that the trade-off between accountability and representation is a 
feature of institutional design. I however argue that it is rather an irresolvable tension that is an 
outcome of relying on one vote to achieve multiple targets. 
There are different normative theories of democracies based upon the normative democratic 
values. However, the normative value of accountability is not an explicit focus of most of these 
theories. I attempt to fill this gap by providing a rough sketch of an accountability theory of 
democracy. I also find that most theories of voter behavior end up neglecting the democratic value 
of ‘accountability’. Further, there are very few studies on comparative voter behavior as compared 
to studies on electoral systems or democracies, that systematically investigate the trade-off 
between accountability and representation. Situating ‘economic voting’ as an application of the 
accountability theory of democracy, I then examine the fallacies of such accountability model. 
There are multiple limitations of relying excessively on a principal-agent model to study economic 
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voting. I particularly focus on its impact on ideological congruence. I use the data from CSES to 
examine my arguments, 
Focusing on the 35 countries covered in the fourth round of CSES during 2011–2016, I find that 
punishing is associated with congruence between incumbent parties and their voters. Punishing is 
a peculiar way of conceptualizing economic voting. The mainstream studies on economic voting 
do not filter the support for incumbents by their previous vote-choice. In other words, voters of 
non-incumbent parties that continue to vote against the incumbent parties are treated at par with 
the voters of incumbent parties who switch their votes. The effects of economic evaluations on 
support for incumbents are thus blind to the previous vote-choice. I argue that the economic voting 
can be better understood through the lens of punishing voters. This lens primarily implies that the 
vote-switching from incumbent to non-incumbent parties can be seen as a way to represent 
economic voting. When the economic evaluations worsen, the punishing (switching from 
incumbent to non-incumbents) rises.  However, this has an affect on the ideological congruence 
between the incumbent parties and their voters. As the punishing increases, the congruence 
between incumbent parties and their voters increases. This could be on the grounds that punishing 
voters are neither as attached to the incumbent parties as the non-punishing voters, nor do they 
have similar ideological positions as compared to non-punishing voters of the incumbent parties. 
5.2 Limitations of the study 
This study is limited by the countries included in the fourth round of CSES. Second, although the 
CSES data was used to calculate the proportion of voters who have previously voted for incumbent, 
this might not be an accurate representation of their sample universe. In other words, the sample 
of voters who have previously voted for incumbents in my study might not be representative of 
the voters who have previously voted for incumbent parties. A panel survey might perhaps be 
better suited to examine the trade-off between retrospective evaluations and the ideological 
congruence between incumbent parties and voters. 
The inclusion of 35 countries across the world controls for the country-specific contextual factors. 
However, this also masks the internal variations. In other words, both the concepts of punishing 
and its impact on congruence might vary across countries. This could be examined by classifying 
countries on the basis of consolidated party systems. Further, although the CSES data accounts for 
the different inter-countries’ interpretations of left-right scale, there might also be an intra-country 
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divergence in the interpretations of this scale by experts and voters. This weakens my arguments 
as I rely on self-positioning of voters to determine their ideological positions, while relying on 
experts from CSES to classify the incumbent parties.  
Finally, the mechanism through which I expect punishing to affect the ideological congruence is 
not insightful on the ‘causality’ issue. In other words, it is unclear if poor economic evaluations 
cause weak attachment between punishing voters and incumbent parties; or if the weak attachment 
between incumbent parties and voters causes the voters to have poor economic evaluations. 
However, economic evaluations still have a statistically significant relationship with vote 
switching, even after controlling for party attachment. 
5.3 Way forward 
There are multiple studies that highlight that liberal democracies are at a pivotal point (Levitsky 
& Ziblatt 2018; Foa and Mounk, 2017).  Further, there is considerable scholarship (Van der Meer, 
2010; Roleff, 2006; Holmberg et al., 2017) that cites the decline of public trust in the parliament 
and the political parties over the past few decades. The rise of anti-systemic parties poses a threat 
to the stability of democracy being the ‘only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996). It is hence 
crucial to examine if there is any space for institutional creativity that could address the 
dissatisfaction of voters with democracy on counts of accountability and representation. 
My argument denotes that the congruence of the incumbent parties and voters increases as there is 
a rise in punishing. In the countries where incumbents stayed in power during the fourth round of 
CSES, this would imply that the congruence between the incumbent parties and their voters 
became stronger at the cost of worsening economic conditions.  In other words, the voters of the 
incumbent parties had the option of either punishing the incumbent parties or to focus on 
ideological congruence. This raises a more interesting question about the profile of the voters who 
stayed with incumbents despite being dissatisfied with the economic performance of the 
incumbents.  Subsequent studies could explore if there is any association of these non-punishing 
voters and dissatisfaction with democracy. In a similar way, it would be interesting to examine the 
satisfaction with democracy of the punishing voters. Analogously, similar studies could also be 
undertaken for the rewarding voters during the time of improving economic conditions to examine 
the argument of trade-off. Overall, the voters seem to be caught between retrospective evaluations 
and ideological congruence and this does not fare well for any conceptualization of democracy! 
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Appendix 1: Effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties 
S. No Countries Effective number of Electoral Parties Effective number of Parliamentary 
Parties 
1 Argentina (2015) 3.4 3.52 
2 Australia (2013) 3.42 2.36 
3 Austria (2013) 5.15 5.06 
4 Brazil (2014) 7.58 13.33 
5 Bulgaria (2014) 5.78 5.06 
6 Canada (2011, 2015) 3.43, 3.34 2.41, 2.5 
7 Cech republic (2013) 7.61 5.62 
8 Finland (2015) 6.57 5.84 
9 France (2012) NA NA 
10 Germany (2013) 4.81 3.5 
11 Great Britain (2015) 3.75 2.4 
12 Greece (2012, 2015) 5.2, 4.43 3.76, 3.09 
13 Iceland (2013) 5.83 4.43 
14 Ireland (2011) 4.44 3.44 
15 Israel (2013) 8.68 7.28 
16 Japan (2013) 4.25 2.26 
17 Latvia (2011, 2014) 5.06, 5.69 4.53 
18 Mexico (2012, 2015) 4.72, 6.23 3.57, 4.28 
19 Montenegro (2012) 3.44 3.18 
20 New Zealand (2011, 
2014) 
3.15, 3.28 2.96,2.98 
21 Norway (2013) 4.87 4.39 
22 Philippines (2016) 4.41 5.43 
23 Poland (2011) 3.42 3 
24 Portugal (2015) 3.42  
25 Republic of Korea 
(2012) 
3.05 2.28 
26 Romania (2012, 2014) 2.55 (2) 2.12 (2) 
27 Serbia (2012) 6.32 4.87 
28 Slovakia (2016) 7.31 5.67 
29 Slovenia (2011) 5.53 4.73 
30 South Africa (2014) 2.27 2.26 
31 Sweden (2014) 5.42 4.99 
32 Taiwan (2012) 2.33 2 
33 Thailand (2011) 2.76 2.57 
34 Turkey (2015) 3.66 3.13 
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